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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW,
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, AND NIETZSCHE'S
"ETERNAL RETURN": TURNING THE WHEEL

BARBARA STARK*

INTRODUCTION
Much of the important feminist scholarship on international human
rights law has been deconstructive;' that is, feminists have taken apart
international human rights law to show how it neglects and marginalizes
women, how it does not do enough for them, and how it may even
perpetuate their subordination. 2 Less has been written about its potential
* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. LL.M., Columbia Law
School, 1989; J.D., N.Y.U. School of Law, 1976; B.A., Cornell University, 1974. Warm
thanks to Fran Ansley, Kathy Bohstedt, Hilary Charlesworth, Judy Cornett, Tom Davies,
Rosalind Hackett, Catharine MacKinnon, Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Nadine Taub, Shelley
Wright, and the students in my International Human Rights Seminar for their helpful
comments on earlier versions of this Article; to Aya Gruber for a thoughtful edit; to
Werner Dannhauser for an unforgettable introduction to Nietzsche; and to Katrina
Bowman for her diligent secretarial assistance. I presented ideas from this Article at the
Annual Meetings of the International Studies Association and the American Society of
International Law, and I thank the participants for their comments. I also gratefully
acknowledge the generous support of the Faculty Development Programs of the University of Tennessee and the College of Law, the Lewis King Kreig & Waldrop Fund, and
the Carden Research Fund. Susanne Bales, Philip Burnett, Gabrielle Cowan, and Jeffrey
Grimes provided outstanding research assistance.
I See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practiceand Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
For the purposes of this Article, deconstruction may be understood as a form of critical
analysis with which to expose and question the underlying premises of a particular
assumption. Professor Balkin's pellucid introduction focuses on the "inversion of hierarchies and the liberation of the text from the author." Id. at 746. The feminist
scholarship cited in infra note 2 has ably done both. For full and rigorous discussions
of deconstruction in general, see JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY
AND CRITIcIsM AFTER STRUCTURALISM (1982); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY

(Gayatri C. Spivak trans., 1976). For a sharply observed deconstruction of gender, see
Joan
C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 806 (1989).
2
See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to InternationalLaw, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991) (providing a groundbreaking analysis of gender bias of
international law); HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Rebecca Cook ed., 1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN]; Symposium, Feminist Inquiries into InternationalLaw, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.

293 (1993); Marilyn Waring, Gender and InternationalLaw: Women and the Right to
Development, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 177 (1992); Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as
Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTs. Q. 486, 487 (1990)
("The specific experiences of women must be added to traditional approaches to human
rights in order to make women more visible and to transform the concept and practice
of human rights in our culture so that it takes better account of women's lives.'); Karen
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usefulness, especially for women in the United States.3 This Article is
part of an emerging reconstructive project. 4 It explains what American
feminists would gain by giving international human rights an active role
in domestic feminism.
Part I explains how human rights law enables those denied their rights
to assert claims against their own States.5 Part II relies on the recent work
of feminist historian Gerda Lemer to describe how women have repeatedly
reinvented "feminist consciousness" during the past 300 years of Western
civilization6 and how feminist consciousness has repeatedly waned and disappeared. It then explains how international human rights law supports
that consciousness. Part III draws on Nietzsche's theory of the "eternal
return' 7 to show how American feminists can claim international human
rights law as their own. Part IV uses Adrienne Rich's powerful poem
Turning the Wheels to show how feminists can free themselves from
Lerner's cycles of consciousness and oblivion by using international
human rights law to focus on the real needs of American women.

Engle, International Human Rights and Feminism: When DiscoursesMeet, 13 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 517 (1992); Rebecca J. Cook, Women's International Human Rights: A
24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 857 (1992).
Bibliography,
3

The most notable exception is the outstanding body of work on the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), entered into
force Sept. 3, 1981. G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193,
U.N. Doe. A/34/46 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980). See, e.g., MALVINA
HALBERSTAM & ELIZABETH F. DEFEIS, WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ERA? (1987); Cook, supra note 2. But see Anne F. Bayefsky,
General Approaches to the Domestic Application of Women's International Human
Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supranote 2, at 353-54 (stating that CEDAW

itself reflects the marginalization of women's rights).
For descriptions of the ways in which women on welfare are disregarded, or worse,
see Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and Their Children, 26 CONN. L. REV.
817 (1994); NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY (1989); Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in

Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274. For a more recent assessment, see Arvonne S.
Fraser, The Women's Human Rights Treaty, ASIL NEWSL. (Am. Soc'y of Int'l L., Wash.,
D.C.), Mar.-May 1995, at 19.
4 See, e.g., Katherine M. Culliton, Finding a Mechanism to Enforce Women's Right to
State Protectionfrom Domestic Violence in the Americas, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 507 (1993);
Carol S. Bruch, The 1989 Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations, 40 AM.
J. COMP. L. 817 (1992); see also NADINE TAUB, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT (1994); Symposium, InternationalProtection of Reproductive Rights, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 963 (1995); REBECCA J. COOK, THE ELIMINATION OF
(1995).
SEXUAL APARTHEID: PROSPECTS FOR THE FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WO NMEN

5 In international law, "State" is commonly used to refer to a "Nation:' I follow that
convention here, while using "state" with a lowercase "s" to refer to a constituent unit
of the U.S. federal system.
6 GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF FEMINIST CONSCIOUSNESS: FROM THE MIDDLE
AGES TO EIGHTEEN-SEVENTY (1993).

7 See infra text accompanying notes 68-86.
8

ADRIENNE RICH, Turning the Wheel, in A WILD PATIENCE HAS TAKEN ME THIS FAR

59 (1982).
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I. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Unlike the rest of international law, which is concerned with the
behavior of States toward other States, human rights law focuses on the
conduct of States toward their own people. 9 States endorsed the radical
notion of universal human rights in horrified response to the human
rights atrocities of World War 11.10 For the first time in history, States
recognized a bottom line of human "dignity."' They conceded that their
own people had fundamental rights beyond those established under their
own domestic laws, rights that even States themselves could not legally
abrogate. 12
Drafted in 1945, the United Nations Charter expressed States' commitment to international human rights in the most general terms. 13 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, drafted three years later, was
9 See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 595 (3d ed.
1993); Richard Bilder, An Overview of InternationalHuman Rights Law, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 3 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1984).
1'For a definitive history of the period, see RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-45 (1958); see also
JOHN B. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE

(1984) (providing a first-hand account by a participant). See generally TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL

LAW No. 10, 1946-49 (3d vol. 1951); JudicialDecisions: InternationalMilitary Tribunal
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 (1947).
Human rights advocates find the Holocaust very important and its denial very disturbing. See DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON
TRUTH AND MEMORY (1993); PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET, ASSASSINS OF MEMORY: ESSAYS ON
THE DENIAL OF THE HOLOCAUST (1992). For accounts of women's specific experiences,
see DIFFERENT VOICES: WOMEN AND THE HOLOCAUST (Carol Rittner & John K. Roth
eds., 1993) (providing an anthology of female experiences under the Nazis, including
accounts by eyewitnesses and interpreters); R. RUTH LINDEN, MAKING STORIES, MAKING
SELVES: FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON THE HOLOCAUST (1993).
The idea of human rights as we know it may have originated substantially earlier than
World War II. See Jan Herman Burgers, The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the
Human Rights Idea in the Twentieth Century, 14 HuM. RTS. Q. 447 (1992) (tracking
declarations drafted before World War I1). Burgers shows that the Charter was signed in
San Francisco just a few days after the end of the War, before the extent of the Holocaust
was known. While the Universal Declaration was signed a few years later, it, too, tracks
these earlier documents. See id.
Human rights were also consistent with the triumph of democracy represented by the
Allied victory. See generally WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THEIR
FINEST HOUR (1949).
IThe phrase appears in the Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration].
12 1d. (stating that "[it] is essential . . . that human rights should be protected by the
rule of law").
13U.N. CHARTER art. 55,
1, 3 (stating that "the United Nations shall promote...
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction"). "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action
in cooperation with the [United Nations] for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55." Id. at art. 56.
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more detailed but still aspirational.14 It was not until the late 1960s that
the U.N. divided the Universal Declaration into two more specific legal
instruments, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the
"Civil Covenant") t5 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (the "Economic Covenant").1 6 The Civil Covenant
assures familiar "negative" rights, similar to those in the U.S. Constitution. 17 The Economic Covenant assures less familiar "positive" rights,
which are not protected under the U.S. Constitution.1 8 The Covenants

14Declarations in international law, like the Declaration of Independence in domestic
law, are not considered legally binding, in contrast to treaties. The Universal Declaration
is not, by its terms, a treaty instrument. U.N. Secretary-General, 1971 Survey ofInternational
Law, at 85, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/245 (1971).
' 5 nternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171. The United States ratified the Civil Covenant in 1992.
161nternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993
U.N.T.S. 3. As of May 1995, 131 States had ratified the Economic Covenant. Christina
M. Cerna, Human Rights Letter From Geneva, HuM. RTs. INTEREST GROUP NEWSL. (Am.
Soc'y for Int'l L., New York, N.Y.), Spr. 1995, at 11. The United States is the only major
industrialized democracy that has not yet ratified the Economic Covenant. It is also the
only State in the world that has ratified the Civil Covenant but not the Economic
Covenant. Ambassador J. Kenneth Blackwell, Howard Tolley's The U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, 14 HUM. RTs. Q. 485, 498 (1992) (book review). For a general discussion
of U.S. ratification of human rights treaties, see NATALIE KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES
AND THE SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION (1990).
17
Negative rights generally prohibit the State from doing something, such as arbitrarily
arresting or detaining people, or restricting freedom of religion. Such rights are outlined
in the text of the Resolution of Ratification of the Civil Covenant. Mar. 24, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 648, 658.
18Positive rights generally refer to rights imposing an affirmative obligation on the
State. Federal programs, such as Social Security, Medicaid, and Food Stamps, address
positive rights, but they do not purport to meet a "minimum core obligation to ensure
the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights ... "
UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR
TRAINING AND RESEARCH, MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING: UNDER SIX MAJOR
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS at 45, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/91/l (1991)
[hereinafter MANUAL]. See generally Lynn A. Baker, The Myth of the American Welfare

State, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 110 (1991) (book review). See, e.g., Edmund P.
Dandridge v. Linda Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding no right to welfare); William
P. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (holding no right
to sleep in public places); Patricia R. Harris v. Cora McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
(holding no right to Medicaid funding for abortion); Donald Lindsey v. Dorthea M.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972) (holding no right to housing).
As I have explained elsewhere, we have had a sometimes vigorous, if uneven,
jurisprudence of economic rights on the domestic state level. See Barbara Stark,
Economic Rights in the United States and InternationalHuman Rights Law: Toward an
"Entirely New Strategy," 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 91-103 (1992). Even before the Reagan
and Bush administrations, states' provision of economic rights was undermined by the
Social Security Act of 1935: "By dividing responsibility for welfare between the Federal
and state governments, the Social Security Act ... allowed both the states and Federal
government to abdicate leadership and responsibility for administering welfare programs
fairly." MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1960-1973, at 9 (1993).
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are intended to serve as binding law through which ratifying States
enable their own people to assert rights against the States themselves. 19
Although some scholars have criticized international human rights law
for failing to protect human rights effectively, the international community has never provided the political support and other resources which
might have enabled it to do so. 20 Instead, responsibility has remained
with the States themselves. Legal commentators widely recognize that
human rights 2are best assured through incorporation in a State's own
domestic law. '
This does not mean that international human rights are worthless. On
the contrary, the "human rights idea ' 22 has swept across national and
cultural boundaries; it has contributed to the downfall of powerful governments in South Africa and Eastern Europe. 23 Human rights do not
prevail everywhere, of course. Although gross violations occur every
day, the increasing exposure of these violations proves the growing
influence of human rights. Despite its growing influence, however, the
human rights movement remains the quintessential self-help movement.
It identifies its subjects broadly and requires its subjects to step forward,
19 Together, the Covenants and the Universal Declaration comprise the International
Bill of Rights, which States recognize as the definitive law of international human rights.
See The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and CulturalRights, U.N. ESCOR, 43d Sess., Annex, at ii, U.N. Doc.
EICN.411987117 (1987), reprinted in Symposium, The Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HuM. RTs. Q. 122 (1987)
[hereinafter Limburg Principles];HENKIN, supra note 9, at 596.
Most scholars agree that two Covenants evolved from the Universal Declaration
"because of the East-West split and a disagreement over the value of socioeconomic
rights." David P. Forsythe, Book Rev., 8 Hum. RTs. Q. 540, 540 (1986); accord
HUMPHRY, supra note 10, at 144. Another scholar justified the bifurcation of rights into
two Covenants, citing differences in "the nature of the legal obligations and the systems
of supervision that could be imposed." D.J. HAIs, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 666 (4th ed. 1991). While it is a mistake to overstate the distinction
between positive and negative rights, States must use different approaches (recognition
and enforcement) to secure the rights. The States accordingly agreed to recognize
positive, economic rights (which would be achieved through "progressive realization")
and to enforce the negative rights set out in the Civil Covenant. See Limburg Principles,
supra.
20 See Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS, VALUES AND FUNCTIONS 265-

672 1(1990).

DAvID P. FORSYTHE, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 119 (1991)

("Despite the development of a considerable corpus of international law on human rights
and despite the growing proportion of time that public international organizations devote
to human rights, nation-states remain the key to promoting and protecting human
rights.");
accordBilder, supra note 9, at 15; Bayefsky, supra note 3, at 353.
22
For a description of the global explosion after World War II of the "human rights
idea," see Louis HENKIN, TnE AGE OF RIGHTS 1 passim (1990).
23See id. at 23-24; Burgers, supra note 10; HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE

NEXT CENTURY (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994) [hereinafter
AGENDA]; THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (Philip
Alston ed., 1992) [hereinafter A CRITICAL APPRAISAL].
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identify themselves, and claim human rights law as their own. As the
civil rights movement did in this country in the 1950s, the subjects,
themselves, must take the initiative to use international human rights to
24
support claims within their own domestic legal systems.

II. FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
Domestic feminist jurisprudence, similarly, seeks to enable women to
identify themselves as active subjects in American law.25 Women's awareness that they have not been active subjects, that "they belong to a
subordinate group, and that, as members... they have suffered wrongs" 26
24The civil rights movement drew on international opinion in the 1950s. As Mary
Dudziak has explained, the spreading human rights idea that nations could not abrogate
the rights of their own people was an important catalyst:
At a time when the U.S. hoped to reshape the postwar world in its own image,
the international attention given to racial segregation was troublesome ....
U.S.
government officials realized that their ability to sell democracy to the Third
World was seriously hampered by continuing racial injustice at home.
Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61, 62-63
(1966). The Third World was appalled by media coverage of civil rights struggles in the
South. See Vicki Goldberg, Remembering the Faces in the Civil Rights Struggle, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 1994, at H31. The crucial leverage provided by international human
rights helped the domestic civil rights movement obtain desperately needed federal
support. In fact, the Justice Department brief in Oliver Brown v. Board of Education
explicitly described how segregation at home hurt the United States abroad. Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 4-6, Oliver Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); see also Barbara Stark, UrbanDespair and Nietzsche's "EternalReturn": From
the Municipal Rhetoric of Economic Justice to the InternationalLaw of Economic Rights,
28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185 (1995) (discussing the utility of the Economic Covenant
for urban African Americans).
In still too many situations, raising human rights claims is impossible or will cost
those unnamed subjects their lives. Such individuals have no choice but to rely on
support from the larger human rights community. Refugees, for example, have no State
against which to assert a claim. See GIL LOEScHER, BEYOND CHARITY: INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION AND THE GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS

(1993).

2 See JOHN BERGER ET AL., WAYS OF SEEING (1977) (describing "the male gaze": How
women as well as men see women from a male perspective thereby reinforcing the
relentless pressures on women to look in mirrors and objectify themselves); IRIS M.
YOUNG, THROWING LIKE A GIRL AND OTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND

SOCIAL THEORY 150, 153-56 (1990) ("explor[ing] the implications of the basic fact of
the woman's social existence as the object of the gaze of another, which is a major source
of her bodily self-reference'). See generally FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL xiii,
xiv (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992) ("There appears to be a belief that without
an26ontologically grounded feminist subject there can be no politics:').
LERNER, supra note 6, at 274. Feminists have explained how social, psychological,
political, economic, and linguistic constructs obscure women's gendered subordination
so that women, themselves, are unaware of it. See, e.g., SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE,
GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1989) (positing that a "gendered" family is implicitly
assumed by prevailing theories of justice); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986
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is a necessary precondition for "feminist consciousness," according to
Lerner.27 Like the "human rights idea,"28 this awareness is a starting
point that enables women to construct active concepts of "self' '29 and
thus to become "'subjects' capable of acting upon the world rather than
[objects] upon whom others act' 30 Feminist jurisprudence both reflects
this feminist consciousness and shows how the law impedes or supports
31

it.

Term-Foreword:Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 13 n.15 (1987) (stating that
assumptions about race and gender are embedded in the "very structure of our language"); JESSICA BENJAMIN, THE BONDS OF LOVE: PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM AND THE
PROBLEM OF DOMINATION (1988) (providing a psychoanalytic account of gendered
subordination,
drawing on Habermas's concept of "intersubjectivity").
27
LERNER, supra note 6, at 274.
28See
HENKIN, supra note 22.
29
See David M. Engel, Origin Myths: Narratives of Authority, Resistance, Disability,
and Law, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 785, 789-90 (1993) (asserting that narratives construct
concepts of self and society in the context of law). For an application of this insight in
a concrete legal context, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).
Peter Brooks has compared the process of structuring experience into a coherent
narrative, or story, with the psychoanalytic process. See generally PETER BROOKS,
READING FOR THE PLOT: DESIGN AND INVENTION IN NARRATIVE (1984). The feminist
community, accordingly, creates its subjects and is, at the same time, created by those
subjects. Each member is "engaged in a process of earning-making and communitybuilding of which.., she is in part the subject?' JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow:
ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC AND THE POETICS OF THE LAW

39-40 (1985). See also

36
(1989). ("[Tlhere are moments when I cannot clarify what I feel until I talk about it with
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY

certain special partner(s) .

. .

. The full definition of someone's identity thus usually

involves not only his stand on moral and spiritual matters but also some reference to a
defining community."). Cf. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 584 (1990) ("[W]e are not bofn with a 'self,' but rather
are composed of a welter of partial, sometimes contradictory, or even antithetical
'selves."').
30
Charles Lawrence III, The Word and the River: Pedagogyas Scholarshipas Struggle,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2252 (1992). There has been considerable scholarly interest in
the "problem of the legal subject" in recent years. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Problem
of the Subject, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1627 (1991); J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal
Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J.
105 (1993). By "subject" I do not mean he who creates and interprets the law, I mean
she who must first create a voice with which to participate in that process. Professors
Schlag and Balkin discuss legal subjects so ancient, so long-swathed in power, that they
take their legitimacy for granted. (Although to their credit, Professors Balkin and Schlag
do not.) The subjects I am talking about have been so far removed from power for so
long that they view their legitimacy as a miracle. See generally Christine Overall,
Feminism, Ontology, and "Other Minds," in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES: PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS ON METHODS AND MORALS 89 (Lorraine Code et al. eds., 1988).
31 Examples of American feminist jurisprudence include: CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS
IN LAW AND GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) [hereinafter
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY]; AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy
S. Thomadsen eds., 1991); FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (Patricia Smith ed., 1993). See also
Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 619 (1990)
(describing three "central commitments" of feminist critical theories); Joan Williams,
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Lerner links the emergence of feminist consciousness to women's
economic independence. 32 One of her central observations is that economic dependence on men historically has been most women's only
alternative to poverty in the West. Repeatedly, small communities of
women have identified themselves as subjects by becoming economically self-sufficient-and repeatedly reinventing feminism-only to be
forgotten as the privileged few die off and the next generation of women
struggles with economic dependence and poverty. As Lerner notes, "Fully
developed feminist consciousness rests on the precondition that women
must have an economic alternative for survival other than marriage and
that there exist large groups of single, self-supporting women" 33 When
there are large groups of single, self-supporting women, feminism is
miraculously reinvented.
Feminist economists 34 and others 35 have linked women's economic
dependence on men to women's nurturing work, the mostly unpaid
cooking, cleaning, feeding, clothing, and general housekeeping work
they do for the children and men with whom they live. 36 Women are the
Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1572
n.64 (1991) ("Our goal as feminists is to reformulate ideas of 'real' man- and womanhood in less stunted ways that do not track and reinforce current power inequities and
stunted notions of human potential."); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77
IowA L. Rev. 19, 20 (1991) ("Feminist legal scholarship seeks to analyze the law's effect
on women as a class. Furthermore, the analysis is formed by a distinctly feminist point
of view, a point of view that is shaped by an understanding of women's life experiences."). For a nuanced and insightful discussion of the difficulties presented by the use
of "feminist" as a descriptive label, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods,
103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 833-36 (1990).
For
groundbreaking work by international feminists, see supra notes 2-4.
32
LERNER, supra note 6, at 192 passim.
33
LERNER, supra note 6, at 276; see also VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR
ECONOMIC EQUALITY 11 (1988) (quoting Simone de Beauvoir as stating that "[i]t is
through gainful employment . . . that woman has traversed most of the distance that
separated her from the male; and nothing else can guarantee her liberty in practice");
ADRIENNE RICH, Resisting Amnesia: History and Personal Life (1983), in BLOOD,
BREAD, AND POETRY 136, 147 (1986):
[W]omen have been writing women's history-and feminist history-for several
centuries; it is not a new invention, but it has been ignored, buried, erased over
and over. Each new generation of feminists has been forced to document the most
elementary exposition of the oppression of women yet again and also to repeat
mistakes made by sisters of an earlier era.
34
See, e.g., MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED: A NEW FEMINIST ECONOMICS
(1988);
FUCHS, supra note 33.
35
See, e.g., N. FRASER, supra note 3 (sociologist); Martha A. Fineman, The Concept
of the NaturalFamily and the Limits of American Family Law, 4 INT'L REV. CoMPr. PUB.
PoL'Y 15 (1992) (family law scholar); Annamay T. Sheppard, Payingfor Women's Work:
The Unfinished Business of the American Family Law Revolution, 4 INT'L REV. COmP.
PUB. POL'Y 1 (1992) (family law scholar).
36Of course, some women do not live with men and/or children and do not provide
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major source of unremunerated nurturing work at every income level of
American society.37 Nurturing work is so deeply internalized that women
do it unconsciously 38 and so deeply embedded in the culture that no one
sees them doing it.39 Nurturing work remains "women's work" that is
not only unpaid but also unrecognized by the market. As a result, not
only do women work an uncompensated "second shift' 40 but also a
market structure that refuses to recognize other demands on women's
41
time limits women's access to better-paying, higher-status jobs.
Nurturing work is not the only cause of women's poverty, but it is
almost always a substantial factor. 42 The notoriously low wages for paid
nurturing work, such as childcare or nursing, leave many of the women
in these fields hovering dangerously near the poverty line.43 Because of
nurturing services. But even these women are adversely affected by employers' perceptions of them as potential primary caretakers. See FucHs, supra note 33, at 4 (showing
"why even women who never marry and/or never have children are disadvantaged in the
labor
37 market by the same set of forces [that affect women who do]").
See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 8 (1989); FUCHS, supra note 33. I feel strongly
that men can and should do "women's work" see Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism
and Psychoanalysis:In Dreams Begin Responsibilities, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1483 (1991),
but this is not my focus here. See also Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The
Struggle
for ParentalEquality, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1415, 1415 (1991).
38
See Williams, supra note 31, at 1571; BENJAMIN, supra note 26.
39
1t may become briefly visible when there is a gap between cultural and personal
expectations, as there may be between immigrants and natives or sometimes between
generations. See generally AMY TAN, THE KITCHEN GOD'S WIFE (1991). The law
contributes to its invisibility. The Gross National Product does not include women's
work, for example. Maria Odum, If the G.N.P. CountedHousework, Would Women Count
for More? N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, at E5. Nor does the United Nations System of
National Accounts (UNSNA), the international system for measuring value. For a cogent
and provocative analysis of the consequences of this omission, see WARING, supra note
34; see also MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT xxii (1989) ("Ihe concepts and categories with
which
we orient ourselves in the world are internalized in a process of socialization:').
40
HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 37.
41 See FUCHS, supra note 33, at 4. These demands come not only from their families,
but from their communities, where unpaid women "volunteers" run food banks, coordinate clothing drives, and play an increasingly vital role in the public schools. For a
collection of essays providing an historical overview of women's volunteer work, see
LADY BOUNTIFUL REVISITED: WOMEN, PHILANTHROPY, AND POWER 1-115 (Kathleen D.
McCarthy ed., 1990) [hereinafter LADY BOUNTIFUL REVISITED]. At the same time,
feminists have pointed out that volunteerism has been an important avenue to politics

for many women. See Susan Ware, American Women in the 1950s: NonpartisanPolitics
and Women's Politicization,in WOMEN, POLITICS, AND CHANGE 281, 292 (Louise A. Tilly
& Patricia Gurin eds., 1990) ("Women came to politics through voluntarism and
community activity more than through such traditional male routes as business and
law."). See generally ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN'S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS
AND
42 SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES (1990).
See N. FRASER, supra note 3, at 152 passim; FUCHS, supra note 33, at 58 passim.
43For a chart showing occupations primarily held by women and their median weekly
pay in comparison with men in the same occupation, see Peter T. Kilborn, More Women

Take Low-Wage Jobs Just So Their Families Can Get By, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1994,
§ 1, at 24.
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their unpaid nurturing work at home, moreover, women earn substan-4a
tially less than men, and their attachment to the labor force is weaker.
While the majority of women are not poor, the majority of the poor are
women.45 Even those who are not currently poor are far more likely to
have been poor and to become poor than are men. 46 Women are the most
economically vulnerable, if they become sick, and when they become
47

old.

These economic realities pose an ongoing threat both to women's
economic independence and to their feminist consciousness (their ability
to identify themselves as subjects). Lerner argues that because of the
"intellectual emancipation of women... [] patriarchal hegemony over
[Western] culture has come to an end.' 48 I hope that she is right, but
feminist jurisprudence demonstrates the need for law to recognize, confirm,
and secure this "emancipation.' 4 9 In the context of nurturing work, such
law would spread the costs of nurturing work throughout society so that
women would not bear all the costs. If Lerner's reliance on "intellectual
emancipation" is misplaced, such law is necessary and must be strenuously pursued to provide some protection for struggling feminist consciousness. If Lerner is correct, 50 its enactment should not be too difficult.
As I have explained elsewhere, law that spreads the cost of nurturing
work is already recognized as part of international human rights law.5 1
The Economic Covenant 52 recognizes the right of every human being to
44FucHs, supra note 33, at 58-74. This remains true notwithstanding the increasing
incidence of women holding multiple jobs: "37 million [women] are working for lower
wages as clerks and cashiers, nurses' aides and bank tellers, secretaries and maids. Their
wages
serve as a cushion between welfare and getting by." Kilborn, supra note 43.
45
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES: 1992, at 60-185 T.5 (1992); N. FRASER, supra note 3, at 144-45; Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
46As Professor MacKinnon has pointed out, women at virtually every income level
have the job of keeping their partners happy. "What distinguished the bourgeois woman
from her servant is that the latter is paid (if barely) while the former is kept (if
contingently)." MACKINNON, supra note 31, at 9.
47According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the median
income of widowed women over 60 is $6,300, compared to $26,202 for retired couples
in their late 60s. Doris Wild Helmering, Economics of Retiring: He Says Yes, She Says
No,4 8 KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, May 27, 1995, at Bi.
LERNER, supra note 6, at 283.
49 See Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence:An Essay, in FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 31, at 94-95.

50While Lerner's argument on this point is persuasive, feminist jurisprudence itself is
an essential element of the "intellectual emancipation" on which she relies. The need for
a rigorous focus on the law's impact on gender, moreover, has never been more urgent.
See itfra text accompanying notes 115-118 (cutbacks in public spending), 146-148
("engendering"
of economic rights).
5t
Barbara Stark, Nurturing Rights: An Essay on Women, Peace, and International
Human
Rights, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 144 (1991).
52
See supra note 16.
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be nurtured-to be housed, fed, clothed, healed, and educated. These
"nurturing rights" are inverted descriptions of women's work-what
American women actually do.5 3 I am not suggesting complete congruence, a perfect fit. Women obviously do not, and could not, assume sole
responsibility for assuring all of the rights set forth in the Economic
Covenant. The nurturing work actually performed by individual women
varies as a function of age, class, family status, and other factors.5 4 In
addition, not all women's work necessarily promotes the objectives of
the Economic Covenant. Much that does, moreover, is consistently ignored under international human rights law.55
Nevertheless, the overlap where women's work satisfies obligations
imposed by the Economic Covenant is substantial. By requiring States
to "take steps to progressively realize" nurturing rights, the Economic
Covenant shifts responsibility from women to the State for some nurtur56
ing work.
53

ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITU-

TION xviii (10th anniversary ed. 1986) ("Most of the labor in the world is done by
women: that is a fact. Across the world, women bear and care for children, raise, process,
and market food, work in factories and sweatshops, clean the home and the office
building, engage in barter, create and invent group survival."). For a global overview, see
WOMEN WORKERS AND GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING (Kathryn Ward ed., 1990). See also
Stark, supra note 51 (describing the relationship between these nurturing rights and
peace).
The rights set out in the Economic Covenant correspond to the duties imposed on and
assumed by women. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) (explaining how rights correspond to duties). "Hohfeld demonstrated that any supposed connection between liberties
and duties ...is ultimately a question of justice and policy ... "'Joseph William
Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical JurisprudenceFrom Bentham to Hohfeld,
1982 WIs. L. REv. 975, 1053 (1982).
54For a scholarly collection of papers analyzing household resource distribution issues
from the perspectives of anthropology, economics, and psychology, see INTRA-HousEHOLD RESOURCE ALLOCATION: ISSUES AND METHODS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING

(Beatrice L. Rogers & Nina P. Schlossman eds., 1990).
SSWaring, supra note 2, at 182 ("[I]t seems to me that one of the most glaring tools
of continual enslavement of more than half of the human species finds its focus in the
inadequate international patriarchal concept of 'work."').
56For example, one State may begin to meet its obligation by allocating blocks of
housing to State employees. Report on the Sixth Session, Committee on Economic, Social
& Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 21, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23,
E/C.12/1991/4 (1992) (reporting on steps taken by Afghanistan). Another State may
comply by providing snacks for school children. Id. at 29 (reporting on steps taken by
Panama).
Parties to the Economic Covenant already include benefits to women and families
under article 10 in their reports. See, e.g., Report on the Second Session, Committee on
Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 26, U.N.
Doc. E/1988/14, E/C.12/1988/4 (1988) (referring to high Swedish outlays in social and
health sectors). Similarly, States routinely take into account activities of private citizens
providing for their own needs. See id. at 17 (noting construction of residences by private
citizens in Mongolia); id. at 21 (noting visits by priests to the sick in Romania). States
also regularly report State support of such private efforts.

Harvard Women's Law Journal

[Vol. 19

By linking nurturing rights to legal entitlements, and explicitly requiring States to "recognize" them, the Economic Covenant also makes
women's work more visible, less women's personal concern and more a
subject for public debate.5 7 Ratification of the Economic Covenant, even
as a non-self-executing treaty, 58 would trigger and support a national
discussion of women's work.
Even as feminists learn more about their predecessors,5 9 their ability
to build on their work is limited "as long as the vast majority of women
57

This, in turn, makes such work a more likely subject for future claims and for further
State support. It may also, however, increase women's work by requiring them to deal
with State bureaucracy. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 3. See generally Waring, supra
note 2, at 187 (arguing that "non-definition in international law is clarified by the use of
the 'norm' that is, the insertion of the word 'patriarchal' before the word 'family"');
Shelley Wright, Economic Rights and Social Justice: A Feminist Analysis of Some
International Human Rights Conventions, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 263 (1992)
(arguing that the protection of the family under the analogous provision of the Universal
Declaration is not synonymous with the protection of individual women and children
within the family; rather, such protection is presumed to be unnecessary).
Moreover, it does not answer the question posed by Professors Dahlberg and Taub:
Why are women doing this work? Anita Dahlberg & Nadine Taub, Notions of the Family
in Recent Swedish Law, 4 INT'L REV. COMP. PUB.Poi'Y 133, 147 (1992). But it could,
over time, help alter this pattern. "This is part of the feminist claim that the 'personal
is political' . . . . [W]hat was formerly borne as one's private misery is now understood
... as caused and transformable by a pattern of human decisions and practices:' JANE
FLAX, DISPUTED SUBJECTS: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS, POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY

111, 126 (1993).
58 On June 24, 1994, the Senate ratified the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. Both
the ICERD and the Civil Covenant, see supra note 15, have been ratified as "non-selfexecuting." This means that while they are technically law, and their violations are
violations of international law, domestic legislation is required to implement them
domestically. See Alfred de Zayas, The Potentialfor the United States Ratification and
Enforcement of the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: The Potentialfor the United States Joining the Covenant Family, 20
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 299, 304 (1990) ("[I]t is intrinsic in a covenant that is to be
implemented progressively that it is not self-executing."). Under U.S. constitutional
practice, "treaty-making officials, as a unilateral matter, will control the determination
of 'self-executing' in the domestic legal system.' John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in
Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 329 (1992). See
generally Jordan 1. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 Aai. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988)
(examining the history of the judicial distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties and analyzing its continuing implications).
American courts have held human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter to be
non-self-executing. See, e.g., Lois Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985); Sel
Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952). But see Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United
Nations Charterand United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOwA L. REV.
901 (1984) (explaining that other state courts have found circumstances under which
provisions were self-executing). See generally Charles V.Stotter, Self-Executing Treaties
and the Human Rights Provisionsof the United Nations Charter:A Separationof Powers
Problem, 25 BUFF.L. REv. 773, 773 (1976).
As Professor Henkin has recently observed, human rights treaties, in general, can and
should be considered self-executing. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Conventions:
The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
59
LERNER, supra note 6. For an account of the earliest feminist politics of women's
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[depend] for their economic existence and that of their children on the
support of a man' 60 Instead, they remain stuck in recurring cycles of
self-sufficiency and feminist consciousness, poverty and oblivion, no
more aware of the feminism that came before them "than an ant crawling
round the rim of a crystal chandelier knows that it will return to where
it began 61 Feminist consciousness only emerges when enough women
become economically independent of men and only survives when enough
women remain economically independent of men.62 Without State support
for economic rights, nurturing work remains unpaid women's work, women
remain economically
dependent on men, and feminist consciousness
63
again recedes.

IlI. NIETZSCHE'S "ETERNAL RETURN"
A. Reclaiming the Past
What if, as suggested above, 64 Lerner is right about the recurring
cycles of feminist consciousness but wrong about the impact of
intellectual emancipation? 65 What if women grow tired of banging their
heads against the "glass ceiling" and trying to lift themselves up from

the "sticky floor?" 6 What if single motherhood becomes even more
work, see Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning
Wives'
Household Labor 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994).
60
LERNER, supra note 6, at 276.
61
ALAN LIGHTMAN, EINSTEIN'S DREAMS 9-10 (1992).
62
LERNER, supra note 6.
631 am not suggesting that feminist consciousness is now receding, although others
have. See, e.g., RENE DENFELD, THE NEW VICTORIANS: A YOUNG WOMAN'S CHALLENGE

TO THE OLD FEMINIST ORDER (1995) (stating that younger women are repelled by
feminist "stridency" and "intolerance"). There is a small community of economically
self-sufficient women, see supra text accompanying note 33, including women lawyers,
but that community is still small. Whether it will survive the growing backlash, including
the attacks against affirmative action, is an open question. See infra text accompanying
notes 144-146.
64See
supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
65
Lemer's notion of transcending these recurring cycles through intellectual emancipation, resonates with Nietzschean "self-overcoming.' See infra text accompanying notes
85-86. Lerner, however, refers to the group while Nietzschean overcoming refers to the
individual-and only a few, rare, individuals. See infra note 77.
66The "sticky floor" refers to all limits on women's mobility past low-level management. The "glass ceiling" refers to limits on women's mobility past an invisible, but
solid, upper limit. See Felice Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life,
67 HARV. Bus. REV. 65 (1989); JILL ABRAMSON & BARBARA FRANKLIN, WHERE ARE
THEY Now?: THE STORY OF THE WOMEN OF HARVARD LAW 1974 (1986); Tracy Anbinder
Baron, Keeping Women Out of the Executive Suite: The Courts' Failure to Apply Title
VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 267 (1994). See generally Paulette
Thomas, Success at a Huge Personal Cost, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1995, at BI.
Affirmative action in connection with racial classifications has recently been held to a
strict scrutiny standard. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Federico Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097

Harvard Women's Law Journal

[Vol. 19

difficult? 67 What if women retreat, voluntarily or involuntarily, to economic dependence on men and feminist consciousness again recedes?
Friedrich Nietzsche 6869describes similar recurring cycles in his doctrine
of the "eternal return":

[T]he knot of causes in which I am entangled recurs and will create
me again. I myself belong to the causes of the eternal recurrence.
I come again, with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with
this serpent-not to a new life or a better life or a similar life: I
come back eternally to this same, selfsame life, in what is greatest
as in what is smallest, to teach again the eternal recurrence of all
things .... 70
(1995). The extension of this standard from African American women to all women is
hardly far-fetched.
67 See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETO-

RIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM

(1991);

LENORE J. WEITZMAN,

THE DIVORCE

REVOLUTION
36 passim (1985).
68

Professor Nussbaum calls Nietzsche a postmodern hero. Martha C. Nussbaum,
Valuing Values: A Case for Reasoned Commitment, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 197 (1994).
While Nietzsche may be a peculiar authority for feminists and human rights advocates,
using Nietzsche in this context may be seen as part of the deconstructionist project of
liberating a text from its author. See Balkin, supra note 1, at 772-77. Nietzsche has been
relied on, moreover, by feminists and others who recognize him as the consummate
outsider. See, e.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM,
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE LAW (1991). But see SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE
SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 214-15
(1992) ("Feminist appropriations of Nietzsche on [the question of the Death of the
Subject] can only be incoherent."). Relying on Nietzsche, finally, illustrates the possibil-

ity of reclaiming the past by reconceptualizing it. Even Nietzsche's work can be
appropriated. He, in fact, appropriated the work of others. See infra note 70. I appropriated Nietzsche in this context in an earlier Article, see Stark, supra note 24, at 207-12,

in which I used the eternal return to support a different, but not inconsistent, proposition.
In any case, I am unrepentant. As Hilary Charlesworth responds to criticism that
feminists use elements from incompatible theories: "We remain unrepentant. The feminist project in law is less a series of discrete interpretations than, in Ngarie Naffine's
words, 'a sort of archeological dig.' Different techniques are appropriate at different
levels of the excavation." Hilary Charlesworth, Alienating Oscar? Feminist Analysis of
InternationalLaw, 25 STUD. IN TRANSNAT'L LEGAL POL'Y 1, 3 (1994).

69The eternal return (also called the "eternal recurrence") of the same events is a key
concept in Nietzsche's work. Walter Kaufmann, Preface to FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS
SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA: A BOOK FOR ALL AND NONE (1892), reprinted in THE PORTABLE
NIETZSCHE, at 103, 111 (Walter Kaufmann ed., 1954) (citing Nietzsche's characterization
in 70EccE HoMo of the eternal recurrence as "the basic conception of the work").
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA: A BOOK FOR ALL AND NONE,

reprinted in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, supra note 69, at 103, 333. Nietzsche chose
Zarathustra as the literary persona to articulate his philosophy because the historical
Zarathustra (Zoroaster) was the first to argue that moral values were objective features
of the universal. Nietzsche thought Zoroaster himself should rectify what Nietzsche
considered his "mistake:' ARTHUR C. DANTO, NIETZSCHE AS PHILOSOPHER 196 (1965).
Cf. LIGHTMAN, supra note 61, at 8 (1993) ("Suppose time is a circle, bending back on

itself ....

For the most part, people do not know they will live their lives over.").
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Nietzsche scholars and other philosophers have focused on the psychological significance of the eternal return, although their interpretations
vary.71 According to Arthur Danto, Nietzsche felt "this to have been his
most important teaching, and a terrifying idea . . . ?,72 It represented
Nietzsche's rejection of the idea of progressive history, of humankind
learning from the preceding generation, of humankind advancing. 73 Hannah Arendt suggests that Nietzsche's point was that the world view of
"one day follow[ing] upon the next, season succeed[ing] season by
repeating itself in eternal sameness [is] much 'truer' to reality as we
know it than the world view of the philosophers." 74 Walter Kaufmann
explains that although the eternal recurrence reflected Nietzsche's basic
misconception that science had discovered that time repeated itself, it
75
nevertheless had crucial "personal meaning" for him.
To accept the eternal return as a valid description of reality is to
abandon hope,76 to accept unbearable despair.77 What is the point of
acquiring feminist consciousness, or of any other endeavor, if all lead
eternally to this same self, same life? The eternal return is a doctrine of
nihilism, 78 a psychological nightmare that Nietzsche captures in a repul71 Nietzsche prudently refrained from trying to prove the eternal return as a formal
philosophical proposition. Kaufmann, supra note 69, at 111; accord ALEXANDER NE-

HAMAS, NIETZSCHE: LIFE AS LITERATURE 142 (1985) (explaining that the "psychological

use to which [Nietzsche] so crucially puts the eternal recurrence presupposes only a
weaker
view"). Cf. Rorty, infra note 85.
72
DANTO, supra note 70, at 203.
73Id. at 12. See also WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY 454 (1926) ("The

possible combinations of reality are limited, and time is endless; some day, inevitably,
life and matter will fall into just such a form as they once had, and out of that fatal
repetition
all history must unwind its devious course again.").
74
HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND: WILLING 166 (1971). It is certainly truer
to Western women's historical experience of reality. See, e.g., JOSEPHINE DONOVAN,

174 (1985)
("[T]he home-bound woman experiences time as stasis-either as a perpetual repetition
FEMINIST THEORY: THE INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN FEMINISM

or 'eternal return'...."). See generally KATHRYN ALLEN RABUZZI, THE SACRED AND
THE FEMININE: TowARD A THEOLOGY OF HOUSEWORK 129 (1982) (describing housework

in 7positive
opposition to male questor model).
5
Kaufmann, supra note 69, at 11; accord DANTO, supra note 70, at 203.
76
Cf. FLAX, supra note 57, at xiii-xiv ("Full disenchantment would not be nearly as
dangerous or as paralyzing as is the inability of the modern unhappy consciousness to
abandon its hope. The hope is that the monsters and gods it now recognizes as its own
flawed and powerless creations will finally and nevertheless carry out the projects
assigned to them.').
77 See TRACY B. STRONG, FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE AND THE POLITICS OF TRANSFIGURATION 365 (1975).
78See Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 79, 89 n.33 (1992) ("Nietzsche is clearly a critic of one sort of nihilism-the
inability to believe or value that comes in the wake of the collapse of metaphysical and
transcendent foundations. Yet Nietzsche is a 'nihilist' only if one regards (and Nietzsche
does not) the rejection of transcendent foundations as nihilistic?'). Cf. CORNEL WEST,
RACE MATTERS 22-23 (1994) ("[The nihilism that increasingly pervades black communities] is to be understood here not as a philosophicdoctrine that there are no rational
grounds for legitimate standardsfor authority; it is, far more, the lived experience of

Harvard Women's Law Journal

[Vol. 19

sive image: "A young shepherd I saw, writhing, gagging, in spasms, his
face distorted, and a heavy black snake hung out of his79mouth. Had I
ever seen so much nausea and pale dread on one face?"

The shepherd cannot resist this nausea, and no one save him from it.80
He can either succumb to despair or literally "bite" into it. "The shepherd . . . bit with a good bite. Far away he spewed the head of the

snake-and he jumped up. No longer shepherd, no longer human-one
changed, radiant, laughing!"8' Nihilism is overcome not by some external power, but by affirming that meaning is a human construct, and that
the only meaning there is is that which we create. As a corollary, only
by accepting the nihilism of the eternal return can we recognize the
critical importance of "what we eternally do, the joy in overcoming...
the meaning we give to our lives:' 82 As Zarathustra 83 explains:
I taught them to work on the future and to redeem with their
creation all that has been. To redeem what is past in man and to
re-create all "it was" until the will says, "Thus I willed it! Thus I
shall will it!"-this I called
redemption and this alone I taught
84
them to call redemption.
According to Professor Richard Rorty, Nietzsche thinks that a person
can free herself from history, from someone else's version of the past,
only by creating her own.8 5 Nietzschean "self-overcoming" is the process
coping with a life of horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness, and (most important)
lovelessness.").
79
NIETZSCHE, supranote 70, at 271. As Kaufmann observes, "The theme of Zarathustra's nausea is developed ad nauseam in later chapters." Kaufmann, Editor's Notes on
the0Second Part of NIETzsCHE, supra note 70, at 191-92.
8 Not even Zarathustra can save him. "My hand tore at the snake and tore it in vain;
it did not tear the snake out of his throat:' NIETZSCHE, supra note 70, at 271. See also
FLAX, supra note 57.
1
NIETzscHE, supra note 70, at 272. Zarathustra urges, "Then it cried out of me: 'Bitel

Bite its head off! Bite!' Thus it cried out of me-my dread, my hatred, my nausea, my
pity, all that is good and wicked in me cried out of me with a single cry." Id. at 271.
According to Kaufmann, "Zarathustra's first account of the eternal recurrence . . . is
followed by a proto-surrealistic vision of a triumph over nausea:' Kaufmann, Editor's
Notes
on the Third Part of NiETZSCHE, supra note 70, at 260.
82 DANTO, supra note 70, at 212. See generally Karl Jaspers, Man as His Own Creator,
in NIETZSCHE: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 148 (Robert C. Solomon ed., 1973)
[hereinafter CRITICAL ESSAYS] ("When one gives up the moral universe that makes its

demands with logically inflexible unconditionality, no return is possible .... The loss
of the resistance afforded by immutable moral laws may as easily be followed by
abandonment
to caprice and accident as by emergence ...
83 See supra note 70.
4
8 NiETZSCHE, supra note 70, at 310.
5

8 "It is the difference between thinking of redemption as making contact with
something larger and more enduring than oneself and redemption as Nietzsche describes
it: 'recreating all "it was" into a "thus I willed it:.... RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY,
IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 29 (1990). As Kathleen Higgins states:
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through which she accepts responsibility for her own life, rather than
blaming history or God, and claims the past for her own use:
[T]o see one's life, or the life of one's community, as a dramatic
narrative is to see it as a process of Nietzschean self-overcoming.
The paradigm of such a narrative is the life of the genius who can
say of the relevant portion of the past, "Thus I willed it' because
she has found a way to describe that past which the past never
knew, and thereby found a self to be which her precursors never
86
knew was possible.
As Professor Rorty recognizes, self-overcoming 87 necessarily takes
place in a larger social context, a community.88 Rorty's "genius" philosopher or poet can take such community for granted; it is institutionalNietzsche's skeptical analysis of the modem quest for historical knowledge is
itself directed toward immediate experience. The danger he observes in his
contemporaries' obsessive concern with history is a danger to their subjective
condition. Excessive preoccupation with history, he argues, can damage a person's
sense of self and of immediate connection with a larger world.
Kathleen Higgins, Nietzsche and Postmodern Subjectivity, in NIETZSCHE AS POSTMODERNIST: ESSAYS PRO AND CONTRA 187, 194 (Clayton Koelb ed., 1990) [hereinafter
NIETZSCHE
AS POSTMODEPNIST].
86 RORTY, supranote 85, at 29. Charles Taylor finds an analogous paradigm in Proust:
In the scene in the Guermantes' library, the narrator recovers the full meaning of
his past and thus restores the time which was "lost" ... the formerly irretrievable
past is recovered in its unity with the life yet to live, and all the "wasted" time
now has a meaning, as the time for preparation for the work of the writer Who
gave shape to this unity.
TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 51. See also Jaspers, supra note 82, at 131 ("Man's 'freedom'
means that... he is responsible for his own transformation"). See also Charles E. Scott,
The Mask of Nietzsche's Self-overcoming, in NIETZSCHE AS POSTMODERNIST, supra note
85, at 217 ("The first step in understanding the mask of self-overcoming is to follow not
the concept of self-overcoming but the self-overcoming process in Nietzsche's writing!').
87 Such self-overcoming, or self-invention, is familiar to most Americans. Indeed, we
expect our politicians to reinvent themselves on a regular basis. See Michael Wines, The
Nation: Cramming, So Many Minds to be Changed, So Little Time, N.Y. TTmEs, Sept. 11,
1994, § 4, at 1. ("Nobody disputes that Mr. Clinton, already adept at the quick change,
needs to reinvent himself, not just his government."). It happens all the time in domestic
politics and law. See, e.g., Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107
HARv. L. REv. 620, 624-25 (1994) (describing "Justice Frankfurter's revisionist history
of Justice Roberts's actions in 1937" and explaining why "[t]he constitutional crisis of
1937 remains important less because of what really happened and more because the
subsequent explanations and analyses of the crisis tell us much about our desire to shape
the past for use in the present"). We only notice it when it is clumsily done and the
strings show, as they did, for example, when President Bush claimed, "We won the Cold
War." But see PETER SCHWEIZER, VICTORY: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S SECRET
STRATEGY
THAT HASTENED THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION (1994).
88
RORTY, supra note 85, at 29.
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ized.8 9 But for the marginalized, those who can create and sustain a self
only by creating and sustaining a community, self-overcoming is necessarily a community activity. As bell hooks has observed, "We have
known, and continue to know, the rewards of struggling together to
change society so that we can live in a world that affirms the dignity
and presence of ...womanhood "' 90 International human rights law links
such communities of resistance together and moves them "outward, into
the world." 91

B. Reconstructing Contexts
As Nietzsche reminds us, context is a human construct. By asserting
themselves as active subjects, 92 American feminists can reconstruct the
contexts that have constructed women. In Professor Rorty's words, they
can find "a way to describe that past which the past never knew" and
find selves "to be which [their] precursors never knew [were] possible." 93 By reconstructing the context in which domestic feminism is
situated, using international human rights, American feminists can draw
on the hard work already done and the blackletter human rights law
already drafted. By reconstructing the context in which international
89Cf. supra note 30 (asserting that the "legal subjects" described by Professors Schlag
and Balkin similarly can take "community" for granted). See also Joan Williams, Rorty,
Radicalism and Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 131, 146-48
(1992) (describing Rorty's infatuation with the "strong poet").
90BELL HOOKS, SISTERS OF THE YAM: BLACK WOMEN AND SELF-RECOVERY
91

6 (1993).

Itdoes so, in part, by providing them with a common language, set out in legal
instruments ratified by the overwhelming majority of States. Thus, Haitian refugees,
Mexican Indians, and inner-city African Americans can describe their oppression in
terms that the rest of the world can understand. See Stark, supra note 24; Connie de ]a
Vega, The Right to Equal Education: Merely a Guiding Principle or Customary InternationalLegal Right?, 11 HAiv. BLACKLETTER LJ. 37 (1994). It also makes otherwise
invisible oppression visible domestically, as shown in Dudziak, supra note 24; accord
FORSYTHE, supra note 21, at 122. Finally, international human rights law provides
enforcement mechanisms; i.e., courts, committees, and international organizations, including NGOs, although the efficacy of these mechanisms has been seriously questioned.
See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 22; AGENDA, supra note 23. See generally ADRIENNE

RICH, Going There and Being Here (1983), in

BLOOD, BREAD AND POETRY,

supra note

33, at 156 ("It has seemed important to me that as a movement we gain some conscious
perspective on [North American, Euro-American chauvinism], allowing us to see ourselves as a self-respecting and self-critical part of one great movement for freedom
among
others, all interdependent:').
92
See supra note 23.
93See supranote 85. By "reconstructing context," I mean reconceptualizing the context
in which analysis is rooted and acting on the resulting new analysis. Like feminist
consciousness and the human rights idea, see supra notes 22-23, both of which these
reconstructed contexts incorporate, reconceptualization is a starting point. In part IV, I
suggest that feminists can act on the resulting analysis by pressing for ratification of the
Economic Covenant.
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human rights law is situated, using domestic feminist jurisprudence,
American feminists can explain why this blackletter law is so crucial to
American women and why the domestic human rights community cannot
be depended on to make it a priority.
1. Domestic Feminism in the Context of International Human Rights
Feminists and others have already noted the links between the "re95
birth" of feminism in the 1960s 94 and the spreading human rights idea.
Feminists learned about politics from the civil rights and peace movements.96 These drew on the independence movements of the formerly
colonial Third World States, 97 which, in turn, were part of a larger human
the historical privileging of State values
rights movement challenging
98
values.
"human"
over
By situating domestic feminism in the context of international human
rights, feminists can identify themselves as subjects of international
human rights law, and claim it as their own.99 Even as feminists struggled in the 1960s to articulate women's needs within the framework of
male jurisprudence, 100 international human rights law was considering
human dignity from new perspectives and formulating needs in new
terms.' 01 Like American women who nurture and the feminists who
94The phrase "rebirth of feminism" has been independently used by several commentators. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularityand Generality: Challenges of
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520, 522
(1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, FeministLegal Theory, CriticalLegal Studies, and Legal

Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 62 (1988).
For a cogent social history, see id. at 62-66. This rebirth, in turn, gave rise to a
multiplicity
of communities. Id. at 64.
95
HENKIN, supra note 22; SARA EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S
LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT (1979).

96For an incisive and comprehensive account, see EVANS, supra note 95.
97
Malcoln X, for example, described how South Africa and Angola "were taken to
the U.N. for [violating human rights]" and said that "the entire [domestic] civil rights

struggle" should be taken there as well. Morning Edition: U.N. Will Scrutinize USA's
Civil Rights Performance (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 9, 1994) (Transcript #1430-11

available in LEXIS). See also Etheridge Knight, Ilu, the Talking Drum, in 2 THE HEATH
ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 2428 (1990). For a discussion of the Justice
Department's decision to file a brief in OliverBrown v. Board of Education, see Dudziak,

supra
note 24, at 62.
98

For an analysis of the radical change represented by the human rights movement and

its "commitment to human values rather than to State values, even when the two
conflicted," see Louis HENKIN, supra note 20, 215-26 (1989). See also Barbara Stark,
The "Other" Half of the InternationalBill of Rights as a Postmodern Feminist Text, 25
STUD. IN TRANSNAT'L LEGAL POL'Y 19 (1993) (arguing that both halves of the Interna-

tional Bill of Rights invert the historical hierarchy privileging State values).
99
See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. See generally KOSKENNIEMI, supra note
39,0 0at 2 ("Law-creation is a matter of subjective, political choice").
' See
01

supra note 94.

1 See supra text accompanying notes 10-18.
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support them, international human rights law recognizes the importance
10 2
of human needs-to be housed, fed, clothed, healed, and educated.
While American women found little support in domestic law and politics, the international' human rights movement was able to draw on the
Universal Declaration to articulate these needs as 'rights' in the Economic Covenant. The United States has already signed the Economic
Covenant and President Clinton, in response to international political
pressure, has already promised to press for ratification.10 3 As the human
rights community has long recognized, and as the civil rights movement
proved, international pressure is useful to the extent a domestic group
can use it.'0 4 Nonetheless, it has been sufficient to elicit public promises
from the Administration. 0 5 By pressing for ratification of the Economic
Covenant, American feminists can use international human rights as
leverage to obtain broad
legal support for the nurturing work American
10 6
women already do.
As explained above,107 human rights law grew out of the States' recognition that neither their own domestic laws nor their own domestic
political processes could be depended upon to assure the bottom line of
human dignity to which they all agreed. 0 8 International human rights
l02 See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
103David B. Ottaway, Universality of Rights Is Defended by U.S., WASH. POST, June
15, 1993, at A15 (reporting that Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that the
Clinton administration "plans to move promptly for Senate action on the four unratified
treaties"). According to Patricia Rengel, Chief Legislative Officer for Amnesty International, Christopher's statement was intended to pre-empt anticipated international criticism. Patricia Rengel, Remarks at the ASIL Annual Meeting (Apr. 9, 1994). As of Dec.
1, 1994, ICESCR was not being seriously considered for ratification. Status of Ratification of Other Conventions, INT'L HuM. RTs. L. UPDATE (Aspen Inst. Justice and Soc'y
Project, New York, N.Y.), Fall 1994, at 3. See also infra note 130.
1
04International pressure is very different today than it was during the Cold War when
the Soviets sought to exploit the civil rights struggles. The Soviet Union broadcast 1400
pictures abroad. The international community was appalled by media coverage of civil
rights struggles in the South: "Those pictures of dogs and fire hoses were published in
Europe, Africa, India, Japan. Photographs were especially powerful in countries where
large parts of the population could not read:' Vicki Goldberg, Remembering the Faces
in the
Civil Rights Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1994, at H31.
05
See supra note 103. See also A. Fraser, supra note 3 (stating that the Clinton
Administration has submitted CEDAW to the Senate and the Foreign Relations Committee recommended ratification). Senator Jesse Helms has blocked further action on
CEDAW, as well as other treaties, until the Administration heeds his unilateral demand
to drastically reduce executive offices and expenditures in connection with foreign policy.
See Elaine Sciolino, Awaiting Call, Helms Puts Foreign Policy on Hold, N.Y. TiMEs,
Sept.
24, 1995, at 1.
106 Feminists are not the only domestic constituency for whom economic rights are a
vital concern. See Stark, supra note 24; Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant
on Economic, Social and CulturalRights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84
AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 392 (1990) (asserting that groups dealing with homelessness, child
abuse, malnutrition, and access to education should support ratification).
107 See supra part I.
10

8See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
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law provides the basic legal framework for those human rights neglected
by domestic law. 10 9 In the United States, as feminists such as Robin West
and Mary Becker have pointed out, economic rights are the human rights
neglected
and American women and their children are the ones who
10
suffer.
As the Supreme Court consistently has held, the Constitution does not
assure economic rights, even those necessary to human dignity."' Nor
can the American political process be depended upon to do so, as commentators have argued,112 as history has shown, 1 3 and as the November
1994 election again confirmed." 4 The frenzied cutbacks in public spending, 115 the attacks against legal as well as illegal immigrants," 6 and the
09
In fact, Justices Marshall and Brennan cited Art. 25 of the Universal Declaration in
their0 dissent in Edmund P. Dandridge v. Linda Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
" Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 TENN. L. REv. 441 (1992); Mary E. Becker,
Politics, Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 169, 172-78 (1989).
See also Hester Lessard, Relationship, Particularity,and Change: Reflections on R. v.
Morgentaler and Feminist Approaches to Liberty, 36 McGILL L.J. 263 (1991).
'2 See supra note 18.
"1 See infra note 164.
"'Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 484-85 ("In the area of economics and social welfare, a
State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications
made by its laws are imperfect?'). If positive rights were not contemplated by the Framers,
they must be left to the political process, even if those who have the greatest need for
economic rights-the homeless, the disabled, the very old, the very young, the uneducated, the non-English speaking-are those least able to participate in that process.
Many have questioned the legitimacy of the American political process for precisely this
reason. See, e.g., The Constitution as an Economic Document: A Symposium Commemorating the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution,56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1987).
But see Akhil Reed Amar, Some Comments on "The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,"
15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 100 (1992) ("[F]rom the perspective of 1787, the process
by which the Constitution became the supreme law of the land was more fundamentally
participatory and democratic than anything that had ever preceded it... ").
114William Buckley's National Review viewed the November 1994 election as a
popular rejection of Clinton, the Democrats, and liberalism in general. See Rich Lowry,
Renovating the House, NAT'L REv., Dec. 19, 1994, at 37, 37. Mother Jones says that
America is having a "religious crisis," that "freely chosen and meaningful" work is our
real religion, and that we are "scared to death about the future of work?' Jeffrey Klein,
Why Newt Now?, MOTHER JONES, Mar./Apr. 1995, at 3, 3. Others suggest that the
election is, perhaps, better read as a rejection of party politics. See, e.g., STANLEY B.

GREENBERG, MIDDLE CLASS DREAMS: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF THE NEW AMERICAN

MAJORITY (1995); Steven V. Roberts et al., Sea Change, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov.

21, 1994 ("Behind the Republican tide lie warnings from America to both parties'");
President Clinton, We Must Forge a New Social Compact, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1995,
at A30 (State of the Union Address, 1995).
15See Jonathan Alter, Decoding the Contract, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9, 1995, at 26, 27

(reporting on Republican proposal promises to prohibit welfare for welfare mothers and
to deny increased AFDC for additional children born while on welfare); Robert S.
McIntyre, Taxing the Poor, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 30, 1995, at 15; Robert B. Reich,

Drowning in the Second Wave, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995, § 4, at 15 (asserting that
Republican proposals to cut federal funding for education and job-training and to shift
responsibility to the states "won't help the millions of Americans who risk drowning in
the new economy").
ll6jim Impoco & Mike Tharp, California Tries to Give Back the Tired and the Poor,
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hysterical threats to take children away from their mothers 1 7 are precisely the kinds of human rights violations, carried out by the government and unchecked by domestic controls, contemplated by the international human rights community.'18 The Economic Covenant was enacted
thirty years ago to deal with these violations. 119
Like human rights activists, feminists recognize the limitations of
domestic law. As Audre Lorde put it, "The master's tools will not dismantle the master's house.' 120 Just as those in other countries need a
new language, a new legal framework, for the civil liberties' 21 that many
take for granted here, 122 the United States needs a new language, a new
legal framework, for economic and social rights. 23 Economic rights
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 21, 1994, at 42 (reporting that voters approve
Proposition 187, which "cuts off education and all but emergency health care for illegal
aliens and requires . . . teachers and doctors to turn illegals [in]"); Don't Panic, NEw
REPUBLIC, Nov. 21, 1994, at 7 ("In a truly dark twist," student/citizens would also be
required to turn in their illegal parents.); Robert Pear, Deciding Who Gets What in
America, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1994, at E5 (describing Republican proposals to eliminate
benefits for legal aliens); Peter Schrag, Son of 187, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 30, 1995, at 16
(describing the California Civil Rights Initiative, an anti-affirmative action initiative).
117 See, e.g., The Orphanage,NEWSWEEK, Dec. 12, 1994 (reporting that a half million
children are in "government funded substituted care, 75% in foster homes"). But see
Hillary Rodham Clinton, The Fight Over Orphanages,NEWSWEEK, Jan. 16, 1995, at 22
(noting that the law recognizes that "a child should be with his or her parents unless
there
is convincing evidence [of] abuse or neglect").
11
See generally RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 323-29 (describing economic and social
rights in the U.N. Charter).
119 Id.
120Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Not Dismantle the Master's House, in THIS
BRIDGE CALLED My BACK: VRITINGS BY RADICAL VOMEN OF COLOR (2d ed. 1983). But
see Linda McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary and the Body,
7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 197 n.4 (1995) (criticizing feminist tendency to discount
the usefulness of such tools in the context of privacy).
121Many newly emerging States have sought guidance from American constitutional
law and American constitutional lawyers in drafting their own Constitutions. See
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD (George Ethan Billias ed., 1990); William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Worldwide Influence of the U.S. Constitution as a "Charter of Human
Rights," 15 NOVA L. REv. (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the
Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 483 (1991). But see Preface, Approaching Democracy:
A New Legal Orderfor Eastern Europe, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 439, 440 (1991) ("Eastern
Europe must consult many models, not just the American, as it goes about the business
of constitution-making ... "'). See also Christopher Osakwe, Introduction: The Problems of the Comparability of Notions in ConstitutionalLaw, 59 TUL. L. REv. 875 (1985).
See generally Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses-andNonuses of Comparative Law, 72 Nw. U.
L. 2REV.
198 (1977).
1 2 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 39, at xx n.6 (summarizing Derrida's proposition that
"the unprivileged conceptual opposite-'that dangerous supplement'-will, under analysis, always show itself as the dominating one"). Here, the right to a decent standard of
living, the "unprivileged" conceptual opposite of our constitutional civil and political
rights, the rights actually set out in the Economic Covenant, in fact dominates. Those
who claim a higher priority for civil and political rights are those who take their own
social and economic rights for granted. See Stark, supra note 24, at 224-26.
123MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIs-

COURSE (1991).

1996]

Human Rights Law and Feminist Jurisprudence

191

represent the real contribution of international human rights law to domestic jurisprudence. Americans generally think of human rights law as
protection for oppressed people in distant places, people denied their
civil and political rights. 124 The Economic Covenant offers protections
for the oppressed in this country, including the growing numbers of
women and children denied basic economic rights
taken for granted in
12
every other Western industrialized democracy.
2. International Human Rights in the Context of Domestic Feminism
International human rights law is not a panacea for women. International feminists have criticized international human rights law, as domestic feminists have criticized liberalism, 26 for neglecting women's experience and conflating "male" with "human.' 1 27 They have pointed out
that the law, as applied, fails to take women's work into account and
that its protection of the family leaves patriarchal norms intact. 2 8 They
note that the committee responsible for international implementation of
29
the Covenant, like almost all U.N. machinery, is male-dominated.
By asserting themselves as active subjects within the context of international human rights law, American feminists can reconstruct the context of international human rights, from the context of international law
to the context of domestic feminism. They can show how human rights
discourse represents the subordinated half of a larger international discourse and how the domestic human rights community has internalized
and replicated its own subordination. Although American feminists can
assume that the community will support ratification of the Economic

124See, e.g., Human Rights Watch Looks Within, NEw YORKER, Dec. 13, 1993, at 53.
125This does not mean that the Economic Covenant is effectively implemented in these

States. See Philip Alston, Economic and Social Rights, in AGENDA, supra note 23, at
137.
126
See Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotle, Feminism, and Needs for Functioning,70 TEx.

L. REv. 1019, 1021 (1992) ("[F]eminism has frequently wished to draw attention to
aspects of ethical theory and practice that have not been sufficiently discussed in liberal

political
thought.").
27

1 See supra note 2.
128
Shelley Wright, Economic Rights and Social Justice: A Feminist Analysis of Some
International
Human Rights Conventions, 12 AuSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 241 (1992).
12 91n 1991, only 2 of the 18 members of the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Committee were women. Charlesworth et al., supra note 2, at 624 n.67. For a feminist
critique of the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee, see
Laura Reanda, Human Rights and Women's Rights: The United Nations Approach, 3
HuM. RTs. Q. 11 (1981). But see Andrew Byrnes, Women, Feminism and International
Human Rights Law-Methodological Myopia, Fundamental Flaws or Meaningful Mar-

ginalisation?:Some CurrentIssues, 12 AuSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 205, 219 (1992) (stating
that the Committee which oversees the Economic Covenant seems genuinely concerned
with supporting at least some of the unpaid nurturing work done- by women).
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Covenant, they should not depend
on the domestic human rights com30
munity to make it a priority.
Human rights represents the "soft" non-technological, subordinated,
feminine half of the international regime agreed upon by the world
powers in 1945.131 Just as women have historically been relegated to the
private sphere of the home and family, human rights governs intrastate
relations between the State and its own people in the private sphere of
the State's own law. 132 The U.N. Charter prohibition on the use of force,
in contrast, 133 represents the militarized, technological, dominant masculine half.134 The prohibition on the use of force governs relations among
member States in the public sphere of international law. By the subordination of human rights, I refer to a broad range of acts, omissions, and
sentiments involving an equally broad range of State as well as non-State
actors. 35 The subordination includes the pervasive perception that human rights within the United States are superfluous 136 and that State
resources must be allocated accordingly. 137 During the Cold War, for
130 See Alston, supra note 106 (stating that the human rights community is not the
Economic Covenant's "natural constituency"). But see Louis Henkin, Preface to AGENDA,
supra note 23 (urging ratification of the Economic Covenant). Many in the domestic
human rights community have spent years working for economic, civil, and political
rights against obstacles now inconceivable. This is not intended to detract from their
efforts or their achievements. See, e.g., supra notes 21-22; Bert Lockwood, Toward the
Economic Brown: Economic Rights in the United States and the Possible Contribution
of InternationalHuman Rights Law, in WORLD JUSTICE?: U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 149 (Mark Gibney ed., 1991). But the emphasis remains on civil
and political rights.
1311 have developed this thesis in more detail in Stark, supra note 98.
132See, e.g., Charlesworth et al., supra note 2; Celina Romany, Woman as Aliens: A
Feminist Critique of the Public/PrivateDistinction in InternationalHuman Rights Law,
6 HAgv. HuM. RTS. J. 87 (1993); HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 2. Human
rights law, however, was a radical departure from traditional international law. States
remained reluctant to criticize other States' treatment of their own people. They were
even more reluctant to listen to the criticism of other States. As Professor Henkin has
observed, "Despite the divisions of the Cold War, the international system developed fine
human rights standards; it has not done well in achieving respect for those standards:'
Henkin, supra note 130, at xvii.
133U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4. This half of the regime is supported by unprecedented
powers delegated to the Security Council. Id. at art. 39-51. For a thoughtful analysis of
the "Post-cold war revival of the United Nations (UN) Security Council[,J" see Jose V.
Alvarez, The Once and Future Security Council, WASH. Q., Spring 1995, at 3.
134Judith Gail Gardham, The Law of Armed Conflict: A Gendered Regime?, 25 STUD.
IN TRANSNAT'L LEGAL POL'Y 171 (1993); Christine M. Chinkin, Peace and Force in
InternationalLaw, id. at 203; Stark, supra note 51. See also Christine Chinkin, Women
and Peace: Militarism and Oppression, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 405 (Kathleen E.Mahoney & Paul Mahoney eds.,
1993); Christine Chinkin, A Gendered Perspective to the International Use of Force, 12
AUSTL.
Y.B. INT'L 279 (1992).
135 See generally Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's
Human Rights, 7 HARv. HUM. RTS. J.125 (1994).
136Civil and political rights are presumably eclipsed by domestic law, and economic
rights are pre-empted by opportunity. See infra text accompanying notes 140-143.
137
See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Cold War Without End, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993,
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example, policymakers justified civil defense drills and a soaring defense
budget with the ubiquitous rhetoric of national security. 138 They banished
care to the
the rhetoric of human rights and the rhetoric of empathy and139
private sphere, the women's sphere of the home and family.

Domestic human rights discourse replicates this gendered division.
Civil and political rights, governing relations among those who move in
the public sphere of law and politics and drawing on a robust domestic
jurisprudence, represent the privileged, "male" half of human rights
discourse. 140 Civil and political rights so dominate human rights discourse in the United States that legal theorists often use the term "human
rights" to refer to these rights alone, just as social scientists use "human"
to refer to male experience alone.
In contrast, American commentators still relegate economic and social
rights to the private sphere. 4 1 Economic and social rights are virtually
unknown outside of international law classes. 142 Indeed, American com(Magazine), at 28 (documenting 1993 expenditures of approximately $116 billion to
the commies").
"fight
3
' 8For a general discussion of rights rhetoric during wartime and the Cold War, see
SUSAN GRIFFIN, A CHORUS OF STONES: THE PRIVATE LIFE OF WAR (1992); DAVID
HALBERSTAM, THE FIFTIES (1993). For a provocative argument that civil defense could
not-and was never intended to-protect Americans from the bomb, see GuY OAKES,
THE IMAGINARY WVAR: CIVIL DEFENSE AND AMERICAN COLD WAR CULTURE (1995).
139 See Ware, supra note 41, at 288-89. See generally WINI BREINES, YOUNG, WHITE,
AND MISERABLE: GROWING Up FEMALE IN THE FIFTIES (1992).
For a general overview of the increasing, but still limited, post-Cold War integration
of the use of force and human rights regimes, see Conference on Changing Notions of
Sovereignty and the Role of Private Actors in InternationalLaw, 9 Am. U. J. INT'L L.

& POL'Y
1 (1993).
140 See HURST HANNUM, MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1985); Oscar Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The
Human Rights Provisions in American Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643, 646 (1951); Louis
Henkin, The Constitution,Treaties, and InternationalHuman Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REV.
1012, 1012 (1968); Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
405, 405 (1979); Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and InternationalHuman Rights,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 851, 852-53 (1989); Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum, Linkages
Between InternationalHuman Rights and U.S. ConstitutionalLaw, 79 Am. J. INT'L L.
158,41 158-63 (1985).
1 See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
142 The major American international law texts, with the notable exception of HENKIN
ET AL., supra note 9, at 641-44, barely mention these rights. See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER
& PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 901-02 (1995); BURNS H. WESTON ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 740 (2d
ed. 1990); COVEY T. OLIVER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 768-79 (4th ed. 1995).
The large and growing jurisprudence on domestic poverty practice generally avoids
any reference to international economic rights. This may be attributed, in part, to the
factors described in infra note 147. But see supra note 109; Mary E. Becker, The Politics
of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A BicentennialPerspective, 59 U. Cm. L.
REv. 453 (1992).
The United States has repeatedly endorsed economic and social rights in international
instruments. The United States recognized economic rights, for example, when it signed
the Vienna Declaration of 1989. Alston, supra note 106, at 365. See also Conference on
Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Charterof Parisfor a New Europe and Supple-
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mentators have appropriated the term "economic rights" to refer to in43
dividual economic autonomy or freedom of capital.'
As American feminists have argued for years, it is precisely because
nuturing work is valuable to the economy and because women's economic independence threatens the status quo economic hierarchy, that
women's economic rights have been so thoroughly erased. 144 The "feminization of poverty"'145 both reflects and reinforces the engendering' 46 of
economic rights. While this trend is not the only reason for the hostility
toward economic rights in the United States, 147 this hostility has grown
as the links between women's unpaid nurturing work, economic rights,
mentary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter, 30 I.L.M. 190,
194 (1991) (affirming that everyone "has the right... to enjoy his economic, social and
cultural rights"); Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension of the CSCE, 29 I.L.M. 1306 (1991) (follow-up meeting to the Helsinki
Accords); United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, 32 I.L.M. 1663 (1993).
143See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a Coherent
Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329 (1995).
144See ADRIENNE RICH, Blood, Bread, and Poetry: The Location of the Poet (1984),
in BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY, supra note 33, at 167, 182 ("We pointed out that
women's unpaid work in the home is essential to every economy ... ").
Because economically independent American women are a major threat to male
prerogatives, they have been the target of a major attack. They have been blamed for the
breakup of the American family, the crisis facing American children, and the lack of jobs
for American men. See SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST
AMERICAN WOMEN 3 passim (1991); SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE
FAMILY 25 passim (1989); see generally N. FRASER, supra note 3; Fineman, supra note
35.
Martha Fineman has described how poverty discourse draws on sexist stereotypes to
condemn single mothers even as it undermines them. Fineman, supra note 3, at 276. For
a general, historical discussion of single motherhood and welfare, see LINDA GORDON,
PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE

1890-

1935 (1994).
45See, e.g., N. FRASER, supra note 3, at 147 ("Today, in fact, women have become
the principal subjects of the welfare state.").
146See generally Minow, supra note 26.
147In part, this hostility can be attributed to the rhetoric of opportunity, the rhetoric of
the "American Dream." Barbara Stark, Postmodern Rhetoric, Economic Rights and all
International Text: "A Miraclefor Breakfast," 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 433, 438 (1993). In
part, it can be attributed to the Cold War, to what Professor Henkin has referred to as
the "blind confusion of ideological communism ... with commitment to the welfare of
individual human beings...
Henkin, supra note 130, at xx. See generally DAVID M.
OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY So IMMENSE: THE WORLD OF JOE MCCARTHY (1983); THOMAS
C. REEVES, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JOE MCCARTHY: A BIOGRAPHY (1982).

After World War II, domestic groups concerned with economic rights, moreover,
prudently steered clear of the Economic Covenant with its troublesome associations with
foreign policy. Instead, loose and shifting coalitions of grassroots organizations have
championed economic rights, usually functioning on a local, community level. See
THOMAS A. KRUEGER, AND PROMISES TO KEEP: THE SOUTHERN CONFERENCE FOR

HUMAN WELFARE 1938-1948, 139-58 (1967) (discussing postwar labor organizing in

the South);

ANTHONY DUNBAR, AGAINST THE GRAIN: SOUTHERN RADICALS AND PROPHETS 1929-1959 199 passim (1981) (explaining why "[r]adicals . . . did not emerge as

leaders in human rights causes after the war"); LADY BOUNTIFUL REVISITED, supra note
41, at 1-115 (describing the responsibilities historically assumed by American women
through volunteer organizations).
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and women's economic independence from men have become increasingly clear. 148 Women are economically dependent on men because of
women's unpaid nurturing work.149 Economic rights, by assuring affordable
and dependable child care, for example, 15° shift at least some of the burden
of women's nurturing work to the broader society. This enables women
to support themselves better and, at the same time, decreases individual
women's economic dependence on individual men. Thus, recognition of
economic rights not only requires men in general to assume more of the
costs of unpaid nurturing work, but also imposes more of the actual burden
of nurturing work on individual men because it makes nuturing work a
social issue, not merely a woman's issue. Economic rights directly challenge the gender-based division of labor and resources. This is why a "war
against poor women is a war against all women,'1'1 and economic rights
are a critical feminist issue. 152 The subordination of economic rights in
this country reflects and perpetuates women's subordination.

In part, one may attribute hostility to economic rights to deep, pervasive racism. See
generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). But "opportunity" has increasingly
less meaning. See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, Up From Welfare: It's Harderand Harder,N.Y.
TIMES Apr. 16, 1995, § 4, at 1 (reporting that "[f]or all but the most skilled or best
educated new workers, wages and hours are the stingiest since President Franklin D.
Roosevelt created the welfare system").
1481Broad-based support for certain economic rights has not eroded. See THEODORE R.
MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD

WELFARE STATE:

PERSISTENT MYTHS,

ENDURING REALITIES 47-48 (1990) (noting widespread public support for the Medicare,
Food Stamp and Social Security programs). See generally WALLACE C. PETERSON,
SILENT DEPRESSION: THE FATE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (1994) (describing the paradox
of a growing economy and increasing hardships for most of the population). KEVIN
PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE

IN THE REAGAN AFTERMATH (1990) (arguing that the widening gap between rich and
poor, along with greater concentration of wealth, is likely to lead, as it did in the 1930s,
to a resurgence of populism). But see Nicholas Lemann, The Myth of Community
Development, N.Y. TMES, Jan. 9, 1994, § 6, at 54, 60 ("Voters are absolutely certain that
social services cost a lot and don't work, so political support for them is hard to come
by . . . . Everybody involved in antipoverty work . . .fear[s] that public hostility to
Government social-service programs is too strong."); Jason DeParle, In Welfare Debate,
It's Now Not 'How?' But 'Why?,' N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1994, § 4, at 1, 8 ("At least 30
[states] have experimental programs under way, designed to prod or pull people from
welfare,
a pattern that critics regard as a piecemeal dismantling of the system:').
149 See supra notes 34-42.
0
'S For other examples, see supra note 56.
151This is the motto of the Women's Committee of One Hundred. There are approximately 500 women on this Committee. Why Every Woman in America Should Be Aware
of Welfare
Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1995 (advertisement).
152 This engendering of economic rights has a broad impact and threatens even those
who may not feel threatened by race or charges of "un-Americanism." Even Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, staunch liberal and civil rights supporter, questions welfare for single
mothers. See Fineman, supra note 3.
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IV. TURNING THE WHEEL
The road to the great canyon always feels
like that road and no other
the highway to a fissure to the female core
of a continent
Below Flagstaff even the rock erosions wear
a famous handwriting
the river's still prevailing signature
Seeing those rocks that road in dreams I know
it is happening again as twice while waking
I am travelling to the edge to meet the face
of annihilating and impersonal time
stained in the colors of a woman's genitals
outlasting every transient violation

a face that is strangely intimate to me
Today I turned the wheel refused that journey
I was feeling too alone on the open plateau
of pifion juniper world beyond time
of rockflank spread around me too alone
and too filled with you with whom I talked for hours
driving up from the desert though you were far away
153
as I talk to you all day whatever day
I draw on Adrienne Rich's powerful poem here because she explicitly links the themes of the preceding section-reclaiming the
past and reconstructing contexts-together in a feminist project.
Turning the Wheel is the eighth, and final, section of a longer
poem of the same title. The first seven sections explore the ways
in which women have been constructed in the history of the American Southwest. By taking history apart-as myth, as nostalgia, as
process t5 4 -Rich's dazzling deconstruction shows how women can free
53

1 RICH, supra note 8, at 59.
54
1 CRAIG WERNER, ADRIENNE

RICH: TrE POET AND HER CRITICS 156-58 (1988). See
also RICH, supra note 33, at 145:
But you do have a choice to become consciously historical-that is, a person who
tries for memory and connectedness against amnesia and nostalgia, who tries to
describe her or his journeys as accurately as possible ....

Historical amnesia is

starvation of the imagination; nostalgia is the imagination's sugar rush, leaving
depression and emptiness in its wake.
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themselves from history, from someone else's version of the past, by
creating their own. 155
Turning the Wheel evokes an archetypal image, the "turn of the wheel"

suggesting an inevitable cosmic order, 56 if not the eternal return itself.
But Rich playfully reconstructs the context by transforming the wheel
into a mundane, human-scale steering wheel. With a clever twist, she
transforms that which must be passively endured into that which can be
actively grasped and turned to feminist ends.
Rich turns away from abstraction, toward a concrete, reconstructive
project. As critic Craig Werner has pointed out, "The primary concern
of the poem.., is with the problem of transforming this potential into
actuality."157 Rich acknowledges deconstruction as a necessary and on-

going part of feminist practice. Because she fully appreciates the enormous amount of deconstructive work remaining to be done, she urges
feminists to begin reconstruction even as it continues. 158
The poem not only suggests why feminist jurisprudence should adopt
a similar reconstructive focus, but how it might do So. 59 In section five
of Turning the Wheel, subtitled Particularity,Rich instructs: "[D]o not
pursue the ready made abstraction, do not peer for symbols."' 60 Feminists can move toward reconstruction, even as they continue their deconstructive work, by rejecting abstraction and focusing instead on real
women's particular needs.
155 See supra note 85.

156 1n Greek mythology, human destiny was determined by the three Fates and their
spinning wheel. BULFINCH'S MYTHOLOGY 9 (1947). Cf. T.S. Eliot, Preludes, in THE
WASTE LAND AND OTHER POEMS 11, 15 (Harcourt Brace 1962) ("The worlds revolve
like ancient women/ Gathering fuel in vacant lots.").

157WERNER, supra note 154, at 156. See also RiCH, supra note 33, at 146 ("Feminist
history charges us, as women committed to the liberation of women, to know the past
in order to consider what we want to conserve and what we want not to repeat or
continue:').
15SWERNER, supra note 154, at 157-58:

"Turning the Wheel" differs sharply from [earlier poems] in its willingness to
build gradually toward a reconstructive statement in the final sections .

. .

. The

final section of the poem, in which Rich turns the wheel of her car away from the
Grand Canyon, responds to Colter's prototypical example [Mary Jane Colter was
an architect who designed eight buildings near the Grand Canyon at the beginning
of the 20th century] by emphasizing her realistic engagement, rather than her
symbolic association, with the archetypal power of "the female core of a continent"
159 "In place of the generalized commitment to the reconstructive process in her earlier
deconstructive poems, Rich makes specific suggestions concerning the process in 'Turning the Wheel' . . . [i]ntimating the need for continual deconstruction of any mode of
thought which abstracts feminine power from the body which urinates, scratches, snores
... Id. at 157.
l6ORicH, supra note 8, at 56.
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Many feminists in the American legal community have been reluctant to reject abstraction because of the continuing importance to
women of abstract rights. Nancy Fraser has described the social value
of rights: "[Rights-bearers] are in the main not stigmatized. ' 16' Sylvia
Law has noted their practical appeal: "Vulnerable people have good
reason to prefer the harder edge of rights to the hope that others whose
lives are very different will be able to empathize with them." 162 As
Patricia Williams has pointed out, rights have crucial symbolic and
psychological significance: "For the historically disempowered, the
conferring of rights is symbolic of all the denied aspects of their humanity: rights imply a respect that places one in the referential range of
self and63others, that elevates one's status from human body to social
being"'1
Like domestic law, international human rights law recognizes these
benefits of "rights talk."164 Unlike domestic law, it confers these benefits
in the "concrete" context of positive rights as well as in the "abstract"
context of negative rights. 165 As international lawyers have long recognized, 166 and as many American scholars have argued, 167 abstract nega16 1N. FRASER, supra note 3, at 151.
62

1 Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56 BROOK.
L. REv. 805, 816 (1990). See also Nussbaum, supra note 126, at 1027; cf.Catherine W.
Hantzis, Kingsfield and Kennedy: Reappraising the Male Models of Law School Teaching, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 161 (1988):
To call rights talk empty rhetoric and to blame it for legitimating an oppressive
ideology is to belittle the experience of people for whom rights have played an
important role .... [Tihere is no surer way to disempower people than to tell
them that nothing can improve their present situation short of total reorganization
of the social structure.
Cf. Nussbaum, supra note 68, at 209-15 (stating that abstract values are crucial tools
for 63oppressed groups, including Third World women).
1 PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 153 (1991). But see
Symposium, A Critique of Rights, 62 Ttx. L. REv. 1361 (1984).
1641 refer here to actual legal rights recognized in domestic and international law.
Professor Glendon refers more narrowly to a specific dialect of rights in the United
States, which she argues effectively precludes a crucial discourse of responsibility.
See GLENDON, supra note 123. Much of what she describes as responsibilities are
considered rights under the Economic Covenant. Our theses are different, but not
incompatible.
165 This situates Rich's emphasis on the concrete rather than the abstract, in a
legal context. "Housing" is more abstract than "apartment" or "cottage," but it
is less abstract than "freedom of religion." Negative rights, however, may also
require concrete, positive grants, as suggested by the recent Supreme Court decision, Ronald W. Rosenberger v. Rector of University of Virginia., 115 S.Ct. 2510
(1995) (holding that a University cannot discriminate against a student religious
publication by refusing to provide a financial subsidy available to other student
publications).
166 The indivisibility of the two Covenants, their necessary interdependence, and the
fallacy of asserting the primacy of either one, is now well-established in international
law. See Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil and
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tive rights and concrete positive rights are better conceptualized along a
continuum than as polar opposites. Economic rights are rights and carry
with them the benefits of "rights talk." At the same time, economic rights
are concrete; they refer to the actual housing, food, healthcare, work,
and education available to a particular person or group in a particular
place and time. 168 The Economic Covenant is a concrete legal structure
through which feminists can transform
the potential of rights talk into
170
reality 169 for American women.

Political Rights, G.A. Res. 44/130, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 209, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/44/130 (1989) (accepted Dec. 15, 1989). Some American legal organizations
have recognized the linkage. While the ACLU has not endorsed the rights set forth in
ICESCR, it has "recognized that there may be links between economic status and civil
liberties. Accordingly, the ACLU has insisted that government action may not cause or
perpetuate poverty... "'Nadine Strossen, What Constitutes Full Protection of Fundamental Freedoms?, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 43, 48-49 (1992).
167See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969);
Charles L. Black, Jr., FurtherReflections on the ConstitutionalJustice of Livelihood, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (1986) (discussing "the derivation of a constitutional right
to a decent material basis for life"); Paul Brest, Symposium, The Republican Civic
Tradition: Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97
YALE L.J. 1623, 1627 (1988) ("'[M]inimum protections' for the necessities of life...
are preconditions for civic republican citizenship."). For a persuasive argument that
"nonelectoral activity" has played the "predominant role ... in the erstwhile success of
the poor[,]" see Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and ConstitutionalLaw, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1277, 1329 (1993).
168Most of those living below the poverty line are single women and their children.
See supra note 45. The Economic Covenant establishes a "minimum core obligation to
ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights
..." MANUAL, supra note 18, at 45. "Minimum essential levels" may mean health at
certain times and in certain places and subsistence in others. Whether there is consensus
as to minimum standards for human dignity in this country is an open question.
International standards are available for comparison. The World Food Council, for
example, has promulgated workable, globally accepted standards regarding human nutritional needs. See, e.g., Food Consumption and Supply, in UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 1989 REPORT ON THE WORLD

SOCIAL SITUATION 18-35 (1989) (discussing global malnutrition problems). But see
Steven L. Winter, Human Values in a Postmodern World, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 233,
234 n.4 (1994) (asserting that the need to "eat and to maintain bodily integrity" provides
no basis for "definite, universal norms").
169 This is Rich's focus in the poem. See supra text accompanying notes 154-155. See
also ADRIENNE RICH, "Going There" and Being Here (1983), in BLOOD, BREAD AND
POETRY, supra note 33, at 156, 158:
The Sandinistas are committed to providing all citizens with basic nutrition, have
cut the illiteracy rate in half, have wiped out polio and made a huge dent in the
infant mortality rate. These elementary things change women's lives. Food, health,
literacy, like free contraception and abortion, are basic feminist issues.
' 70 For a description of the range of processes through which economic rights may be
assured, see Stark, supra note 147. For a proposal for integrating these processes into
federal and state domestic law, see Stark, supra note 18.

